Abstract. Employing a political-economics approach, this paper compares small states and unions when the former fail to internalize cross-border externalities of publicly provided goods. It discusses two types of unions: federations with more than one level of government and unitary states. While unitary states are unable to differentiate public spending according to differing preferences, rents of governments in a federation are higher due to a commonpool problem. The comparison leads to the following results. (1) Citizens prefer small states to large states if spillover effects are weak. (2) They benefit from a multi-level government only if their preferences heavily differ from the median-voter's preferences and if spillovers are strong. Based on this comparison the paper also discusses the creation of unions. Making specific assumption on the distribution of preferences, it analyzes strong Nash equilibria at the union formation stage.
Introduction
All over the world, the continued existence and the constitution of countries are disputed by centrifugal and centripetal forces. In some countries such as Canada there are strong movements that argue for secession, while other countries such as the member states of the European union are growing together. Moreover, regions, nation states and supra-national institutions argue about the correct distribution of responsibilities. On the one hand, more and more tasks are handed over to central authorities. On the other hand, many regions claim more autonomy. The European Union is a good example for these conflicting demands. The union has a permanently increasing influence on, for example, competition policy and tax policy in the member states. In order to block these centripetal forces, the subsidiarity principle has been set up. Not only in political science, but also in economics the issue of the creation and break up of unions and of the assignment of tasks to the levels * The paper was presented at PET 2002 in Paris and at the CESifo 2002 Conference on Public Sector Economics in Munich, Germany. The author thanks the participants, particularly Anna Rubinchik-Pessach and Dieter Bös, for valuable comments. The usual disclaimer applies.
of government within a union is hotly debated. This paper contributes to this discussion.
The paper analyzes different structures of countries: small homogeneous states, large unitary states with a heterogeneous population and federations with more than one level of government. The optimum size of countries is a balance between the inability of small states to internalize cross-border externalities of publicly provided goods and the failure of large unitary states to adapt public spending to differing preferences in the various parts of the state. At first sight, federations seem to be superior to both small states and large unitary states since each task can be assigned to a level of government such that the territory approximately matches the users of the publicly provided good. If there were no disadvantage of a multi-level structure, it would be surprising that not all countries in the world are federations with autonomously deciding lower levels of government. This paper discusses an explicit disadvantage of the multi-level structure: the common-pool problem in taxation. This problem arises if governments are not purely benevolent and citizens can only limit the abusive power of governments by promising reelection if and only if public spending and taxation is satisfying. Barro (1973) and Ferejohn (1986) first analyzed performance-oriented voting strategies and showed that voters are able to prevent governments from myopically behaving as a leviathan through retrospective voting strategies. However, since governments have the opportunity to use their power abusively, they have to obtain a rent that equals in present value terms the maximum instantaneous rent. In a federation, for all levels of government together, voters have to put up with a higher rent than in a unitary state since a common tax base is a common-pool resource for governments and, therefore, runs the risk of overexploitation. In order to take this particular disadvantage of federations into account, this paper sets up a political-economics model that allows for simple voting strategies to control malevolent governments in all types of countries.
The paper borrows from Alesina, Angeloni, and Etro (2001a, 2001b) , who discussed similar issues, and Persson, Roland, and Tabellini (1997) , who first analyzed the common-pool problem for one level of government in the context of the Barro model (for a detailed discussion of the relationship see the concluding section). However, since this paper simultaneously considers spillovers, heterogeneity of population, and rents of governments, the assessment of federations is not determined a priori.
The purpose of this paper is twofold: First, it compares small states, large unitary states and federations from the viewpoint of citizens when spillovers exist, preferences differ across states and the magnitude of governments' rents depend on the institutional shape. Second, based on this comparison the paper discusses the formation of unions being unitary states or federations.
